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Defense Doctrine and Strategy are designed to be able to 
synergize the performance of military and non-military 
components to protect and maintain Indonesia's national 
interests. The current doctrine of the Indonesian Armed 
Forces (TNI) Military Campaign is still dominant in 
dealing with military threats, even though based on the 
2018 Indonesian Defense White Paper, the TNI must also 
be able to deal with hybrid threats. With its adaptive 
nature to changing threats, problems will arise if the 
military campaign doctrine has not accommodated the 
TNI's strategy and way of acting in dealing with hybrid 
threats. The defense doctrine must be able to 
accommodate the integration of military and non-military 
components is facing various types of warfare and threats 
such as military threats, non-military threats, and hybrid 
threats. Especially for the kind of hybrid threats namely 
cyber threats, terrorism, and other unconventional threats. 
Through an analytical descriptive analysis based on 
qualitative methods, it is hoped that the proper 
organization and doctrine will be disentangled in the face 
of this model war. Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) as the 
war organizations that prioritize a modern universal 
perspective are a necessity as one of the efforts offered. 
This needs to be supported by the doctrine of national 
defense which accurately defines how an effort against 
hybrid warfare can transform from conventional to 
unconventional warfare and the actors involved.  Military 
or TNI organizations that prioritize a modern universal 
perspective are supported by the doctrine of national 
defense which accurately maps how an effort against 
hybrid warfare could transform from conventional 
warfare to unconventional. 
 









The essence of hybrid warfare is a mixed 
war which is a combination of conventional 
warfare and unconventional forms of war. 
Hybrid warfare, among others, combines 
missions and operations of conventional 
warfare, asymmetric, terrorist, and cyber 
warfare, as well as diverse and dynamic 
crimes (Nyagudi, 2020). In addition to 
these various war combinations, hybrid 
warfare can also be in the form of integrated 
attacks by utilizing the use of chemical, 
biological, nuclear, and explosive weapons 
(Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 
Nuclear and Explosive (CBRNE), and 
information warfare (Defense Ministry of 
The Republic of Indonesia, 2019). 
In the face of hybrid warfare, applying a 
military defense pattern by placing the 
Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) as the 
main component supported by related 
ministries or nation agencies and other 
elements of the nation's power including the 
Indonesian National Police (Polri), 
Paramilitary and Regional Governments 
which are informed based on the 
professional and proportional capabilities. 
Based on the Government Regulation 
instead of Law Number 23, 1959, TNI as 
Main Component and Reserve Component 
have to conduct mobilization after the 
President declaring both Mobilization and 
War Situation to deal with military threats 
only.  There is a problem for TNI especially 
for facing Hybrid Threats with a military 
defense pattern that requires the 
mobilization of TNI and other defense 
components proportionally according to the 
level of authority.  The rules or doctrine 
which stipulated deployment of TNI to deal 
with hybrid threats is none currently even 
though these provisions have been 
regulated in Government Regulation 
instead of Law, number 23, 1959, 
revocation of law no. 74 the year 1957 
state-magazine No. 160 the year 1957 and 
establishment of danger (Amendement to 
Law Number. 74 of 1957 (State Gazette 
NO. 160 of 1957) and Determination of the 
State of Danger, 1959). Furthermore, the 
analysis will also relate some interesting 
phenomena that this hybrid threat trend 
occurred until it was determined by the 
Ministry of Defense through a defense 
white paper that must be faced with military 
operations. This is carried out based on the 
escalation of both kinds of threats, military, 
and hybrid threats as well as encouraging 
the mobilization of related 
ministries/national agencies and Local 
Governments to jointly face hybrid warfare 
by paying attention to capabilities 
professionally and proportionally. This 
study aims to analyze the structuring 
development of organizational and doctrine 
of state defense in facing hybrid warfare. 
 
METHODS  
Hybrid warfare is a new challenge in the 
information environment. The nature of the 
military threat environment has changed as 
our adversaries and potential adversaries 
increasingly use nonmilitary and 
paramilitary means to achieve strategic and 
operational objectives that were previously 
considered purely military duties. The trend 
towards using nonmilitary capabilities and 
operations to replace military force, as well 
as the convergence of conventional and 
irregular approaches, have been recognized 
over the years by military writers and 
experts. These tactics employed during 
peacetime competition can have lasting 
negative outcomes that directly affect 
international security, economics, and law. 
Military organizations must deal with 
very high levels of uncertainty (Posen, 
2016).  To get a complete understanding of 
organizational arrangements and defense 
doctrine in the face of hybrid threats as 
research subjects, it is necessary to review 
them based on a research model. There 
needs to be a study and theory that 
identifies the impact of an organizing and 
defense doctrine on efforts to resolve 
conflict. According to the Theoretical 
Framework (Figure 1), the specifics of each 
research  will  be  indicated  from  how  the 
 
 





















Figure 1. Theoretical Framework 





















Figure 2. Research Design 
Source: Wahyuni, 2016 
 
researcher's point of view is in determining 
a military operation as the operating model 
that will be conducted in facing some 
hybrid threats. The reliability of qualitative 
research is very much determined by how 
the perspective is attributed to the research 
topic because this is a controlling tool so 
that the process of investigation, deepening 
of material, and extracting data will be 
following the theoretical basis that has been 
determined (Wahyuni, 2016). 
The Formation Organizational Doctrine 
of State Defense in Facing Hybrid Warfare 
is related to the fact that the determination 
of organizations and doctrines that strictly 
regulate military organizations in dealing 
 




with hybrid threats requires an analytical 
effort that departs from the history of the 
formation of the TNI. Through this 
approach, it is hoped that data will be 
collected systematically and relevant to the 
object of research so that several related 
hypotheses, impacts, and trends will be 
analyzed so that they can assist in 
describing the problems that occur today as 
anticipatory efforts in the future (Gay, 
Mills, & Airasian, 2012). 
A qualitative research method approach 
is also needed which is considered quite 
effective in discussing how the 
phenomenon of every military operation is 
required to be able to deal with these mixed 
threats. To get the right understanding 
according to the process of the research 
design including the attribution of the 
approach used, it will be shown in Figure 2. 
This trend has recently accelerated as the 
superpowers try to achieve military 
objectives without sparking open conflict 
between nations. The mixed approach to 
modern warfare has been given many 
names, including new generation warfare, 
asymmetric warfare, compound warfare, 
hybrid warfare, and has recently been 
described as acts committed in a gray zone 
between classical diplomacy and open 
military conflict. Within the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO), this term is 
used to describe the new operational 
attributes of the Russian attack on Ukraine. 
Russia's use of military equipment and 
troops under the guise of indigenous and 
separatist forces in Ukraine is a tricky 
example of hybrid warfare that includes the 
use of lethal force (Brown, 2018).  
Hybrid warfare uses a combination of 
military and nonmilitary methods in 
peacetime to achieve traditional military 
objectives (for example, territorial control 
or conquest), and thereby alter facts on the 
ground without triggering an actual 
conflict. Peacetime hybrid warfare achieves 
military objectives, namely control of the 
battlefield (Mazarr, 2015). Hybrid warfare 
is a challenge that is likely to persist. The 
contemporary strategic environment  
presents potential adversaries with an array 
of new, more cost-effective means to 
employ in combination, ranging from 
information operations in cyberspace to the 
proliferation of cheap air defense and 
missile technology (Mälksoo, 2018). 
As hybrid warfare is primarily well-
equipped and designed to exploit national 
vulnerabilities across the political, military, 
economic, social, informational, and 
infrastructural spectra, it virtually means 
that it comprises war against nation-states. 
India continues to be vulnerable to hybrid 
threats, being a large, pluralistic, 
democratic nation, with a huge diversity in 
geography, demographic profile, socio-
economic disparity, and other forms and 
manifestations (Ahluwalia, 2019). 
Scramble for land through hybrid warfare 
in peacetime can be seen as shaping the 
field of future military operations by 
extending military control over contested 
land or operational space to make better use 
of offensive and defensive capabilities in 
the event of an actual conflict.  
The Russian and Chinese version of 
hybrid warfare uses measures without 
triggering direct military confrontations 
between countries that would violate the 
boundaries of the treaty. The Russian 
version features unusual and varied 
techniques combining a mix of special 
forces, information campaigns, third-party 
forces, and criminal activity (Ripley, 2014). 
Because Russia and China have developed 
state-of-the-art cyber capabilities and 
strategies. The plausible denial of cyber-
attacks has made it a practical and preferred 
component of hybrid warfare. Russia’s 
approach can rightly be called hybrid 
warfare and argues not only that the hybrid 
label is unhelpful and misleading but also 
that it gives an entirely misplaced 
impression of novelty (Giles, 2016). A 
common feature of this new form of war is 
the accurate strategic management of force 
and operations, down to the tactical level, 
to achieve ambiguity about whether the 
troops and methods used are actually under 
the authority of national command, and to 
 




achieve the desired effect of influence and 
delivery strategic communication messages 
messages across all media. 
China now fully regards cyberspace as a 
component of military operations, as 
revealed in the 2015 Defense White Paper, 
which stated that China will accelerate the 
development of its cyber force, the Stars 
and Stripes newspaper reported in May 
2015. More recently, In October 2015, 
Bloomberg News broadcast the PLA 
announcement that the PLA was 
consolidating China's various cyber 
warfare units and capabilities into a single 
military command under the Central 
Military Commission. The PLA's actions in 
establishing a cyber command come more 
than a year after the Russian military's 
announcement in February 2014 of its 
cyber command. Russia once again acted in 
a way that utilized the potential of the 
hybrid threat as a military strategy and 
modus operandi, this time in the Crimea 
(Bachmann, 2015). The hybrid approach is 
visualized and explained in the Gerasimov 
doctrine and the capabilities are available. 
The challenge is how long those 
capabilities can be preserved due to 
economic reasons. In the short term. It is 
viable until 2020 or 2022, but in the long 
term the Russian economic situation must 
be improved to avoid the implosion of the 
current system (Śliwa, Veebel, & Lebrun, 
2018). 
 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
Structuring the Doctrine of National 
Defense in Response to Hybrid Warfare 
The doctrine of State Defense has a position 
as a basic instrument in the development of 
various doctrines related to State defense. 
Thus, the doctrine of State Defense is 
referred to in the document component as 
the basic doctrine in doctrine stratification. 
Another level form is the main doctrine, 
namely the military defense doctrine which 
is described by the TNI as the Tridharma 
Eka Karma Doctrine, and the non-military 
defense doctrine which is carried out 
through the function of the Ministry of 
Defense which oversees non-military 
defense. While the executing doctrine level 
consists of military defense doctrine in each 
dimension such as the land dimension, 
Kartika Eka Paksi as Indonesian Army’s 
Doctrine, Jalasveva Jayamahe as 
Indonesian Naval's Doctrine, and Swa 
Bhuwana Pakca as the Indonesian Air 
force’s doctrine (Defense Ministry of The 
Republic of Indonesia, 2019). 
Doctrinal stratification in the document 
on National Resilience of the Republic of 
Indonesia has differences with doctrinal 
categorization. Doctrine of the dimensions 
is more of an environmental doctrine 
because it is the nature of how to use force 
in a certain operation (Drew & Snow, 
2006).  Meanwhile, in the documents of the 
Republic of Indonesia's national defense, it 
is determined as the main doctrine, namely 
the TNI doctrine on military defense. 
Furthermore, the implementation doctrine 
in the Indonesian state defense doctrine is 
the doctrine of each dimension of military 
defense, while in the Drew and Snow 
categorization, the dimension doctrine is 
the environmental doctrine. Practical 
doctrines are known as organizational 
doctrines.  The similarity of doctrinal 
stratification in the doctrine of the Republic 
of Indonesia defense doctrine with the 
categorization of the doctrine of Drew and 
Snow's version is the fundamental doctrine. 
The TNI’s doctrine is the dedication of 
three TNI dimensions for one National 
Goal. 
It has been previously explained that the 
position of doctrine is very important in 
accommodating how organizations or 
institutions move in carrying out their 
operations. Environmental and 
organizational, the doctrine that is required 
to be adaptive needs to be able to be 
properly structured, including in 
responding to the phenomenon of hybrid 
warfare.  Several steps in preparing 
doctrine, especially at the level of strategic 
doctrine (Buzan, 2008). First, the perfection 
of doctrine. Doctrine is not something 
dogmatic and irrefutable, on the contrary, 
 




the good military doctrine will adapt to the 
actual operating environment, be adaptive 
to all forms of the situation, and can be 
understood and implemented starting from 
the leadership of the TNI to executing 
soldiers in the field and the doctrine must 
be applied according to the nature of 
warfare. So that to support the readiness of 
the TNI in facing the phenomenon of 
hybrid warfare, the TNI doctrine must be 
able to adapt to the development of warfare 
which applies to the tactics that are 
operational in the field. The tactics must 
adapt to the operating environment and the 
nature of the enemy to be faced, lest the war 
tactics used by the TNI be out of sync with 
the hybrid warfare pattern which tends to 
penetrate space and time.   
The Army as the foundation in carrying 
out TNI operations should be leading sector 
changes in war doctrine leading to hybrid 
warfare going forward. An example of 
success in making doctrine is like that 
carried out by the United States military 
where the formulation of doctrine was 
initiated by the army, while other forces 
will adjust it in the form of a joint 
publication containing basic principles that 
direct the use of the military in coordinated 
activities for the same goal. Second, 
increasing human resources through 
education and training at home and abroad. 
TNI personnel from now on must begin to 
understand what is meant by hybrid 
warfare, how to maneuver Major Weapon 
Systems for hybrid warfare, how to deal 
with cyber warfare and information 
warfare. The demands of war progress have 
forced the TNI to have non-military skills. 
Apart from that civil relations and military 
relations need to be trained in the form of 
integrated training, wherein the pattern of 
operations carried out, non-military 
agencies will provide support in the form of 
personnel, expertise, and equipment that 
the TNI does not have in the face of hybrid 
warfare (Buzan, 2008). 
 
 
Hybrid Warfare and a Universal 
Perspective 
Indonesian national defense is carried out 
by the government which is prepared early 
in the Total Defense System 
(Sishankamrata) through efforts to manage 
national resources which include all human 
resources, natural resources, artificial 
resources, as well as national facilities and 
infrastructure, throughout the region. The 
Republic of Indonesia is a unit of defense in 
overcoming threats. The management of 
the national defense system is one of the 
functions of government aimed at 
protecting national interests and supporting 
national policies in the defense sector. The 
Ministry of Defense as the bearer of 
government functions in the defense sector 
strives to achieve the stated national 
defense policy targets, following the 
national development paradigm. 
The strategic process for dealing with 
hybrid warfare is to determine national 
security objectives as the basis for the 
strategy process. Formulating a grand 
strategy, better known as a policy 
developing a military strategy, designing an 
operational strategy, and formulating a 
battlefield strategy, is better known as 
tactics. The TNI, Tri Dharma Eka Karma 
doctrine emphasizes that the essence of the 
TNI is to be formed to carry out state duties 
in the defense sector is facing various 
threats and disturbances to the integrity of 
the nation and state. Apart from carrying 
out these defense duties, the TNI is also 
prepared to carry out tasks to support 
national interests following statutory 
regulations. The TNI doctrine, especially 
concerning the concept of dealing with the 
threat of hybrid warfare carried out by non-
state actors, needs to be immediately 
compiled so that it can serve as a guide for 
all TNI forces in conducting guidance and 
in using force in dealing with cyber warfare 
threats. 








system is the Total Defense System, where 
the main component is the TNI and the 
supporting component is the people. In this 
context, the universal defense system as 
stipulated in Law No. 3 of 2002 about the 
National Defense System must be able to be 
interpreted as a universe that is not only 
physical but non-physical, especially 
digital and cyberspace. This means that all 
efforts are made including empowering all 
the potential of the virtual world that exists 
in the face of hybrid warfare. TNI 
Readiness Hybrid warfare is a military 
strategy that combines conventional 
warfare, irregular warfare, and cyber 
warfare threats, both in the form of nuclear 
attacks, biological and chemical weapons, 
improvised explosive devices, and 
information warfare. Therefore, facing the 
possibility of the threat of hybrid warfare, 
the TNI must be able to respond and 
immediately adapt to the developing 
situation to anticipate and overcome it more 
quickly and precisely.  
Thinkers from both the military, defense 
analysts, and members of the Indonesian 
parliament explained that the Ministry of 
Defense and the Indonesian National Army 
(TNI) had anticipated the possibility of 
strengthening what was termed the hybrid 
war. It is proper for the TNI to be aware of 
the threat of hybrid warfare, apart from the 
threat of conventional warfare. From a land, 
sea, and air perspective, the TNI must be 
aware of all forms of threats, be it 
conventional warfare or non-conventional 
war such as hybrid warfare (Sa’diyah & 
Vinata, 2016). The situations where hybrid 
threats evolve are hybrid conflicts or hybrid 
wars. Pawlak describes the hybrid conflict 
as a situation in which parties refrain from 
the overt use of armed forces against each 
other, relying instead on a combination of 
military intimidation (falling short of 
attack), exploitation of economic and 
political vulnerabilities, and diplomatic or 
technological means to pursue their 
objectives (Vaczi, 2016). 
 
Preparing TNI with Artificial 
Intelligence Capability 
Symptoms of hybrid warfare are not the 
same as conventional warfare where the 
threat or enemy that comes can look real 
because the threat in hybrid warfare will 
appear in the form of symptoms or the 
opposite effect after it occurs (MCDC, 
2017). To respond to this, a coordinating 
body under the ministry of defense is 
needed, whose membership comes from the 
military and non-military agencies. Both 
members of the military and non-military 
are people who have special abilities in 
hybrid warfare, such as software experts, 
anti-hackers, information experts, 
telematics experts, explosives experts, 
atomic physicists, biologists, and military 
tactics. 
Currently, Big Data is needed that is 
strong, accurate, with an integrated 
architecture to support strategic decisions 
for national defense. The ideal Big Data for 
national defense must be able to present 
accurate, real-time, complete data, to be 
able to do profiling with strong analytical 
support. The key is analytical capabilities 
as the forward projection of a lot of 
artificial intelligence is used for cyber 
attacks. So, in addition to the power of 
Alusista, you must also have cyber power. 
Examples of things that have been done by 
Cyber Defense Center of Ministry of 
Defense RI (Pushansiber Kemhan RI) to 
search information systems. Testing one of 
the government's web or information 
systems. After the inspection, several 
vulnerabilities were found, such as SQL 
(Standard Query Language) Injection, XSS 
(Cross-Site Scripting), and CSRF (Cross-
Site Request Forgery), which of course 
hackers can change HTML (HyperText 
Markup Language) code to exploit their 
information system database. From their 
recent search results, for example, there 
were 4 findings from 4 different domains. 
Such as critical severity that can be used to 
steal   databases.   Luckily,   the    National  
 
 




Cyber and Crypto Agency of Indonesia 
(BSSN) responded quickly to these 
findings. The collaboration between 
Pushansiber Kemhan RI-BSSN is very 
positive. There are mutually reinforcing 
functions. Both are committed to 
maintaining cyber 'sovereignty'. 
Indonesian National Armed Forces 
Cyber Unit (Satsiber TNI) is tasked with 
protecting and maintaining critical TNI 
infrastructure that is connected. Cyber War 
Becomes a New Battle Arena. The threat of 
cyberwar whose presence as cyberspace, 
cyber threat, cybercrime in today's global 
life has given rise to cyber defense or cyber 
defense in various countries in the world. 
Many countries in the world have formed 
various special units such as the cyber 
army, cyber naval, cyber air force, cyber 
military, cyber troops, and cyber force. 
Organically, national security and defense 
are built by the organizers of the electronic 
system universally and continuously. In 
line with this, cybersecurity can be a form 
of cyber defense. The functions that must 
be possessed by Cyber TNI are detection, 
protection, recovery, and ensuring that the 
cyber system that is running does not have 
holes or defense weaknesses that malware 
or backdoors can enter. 
This agency is tasked with coordinating 
the actions that will be taken against all 
forms of potential threats to the country's 
sovereignty when faced with hybrid 
warfare. Once it is time for the TNI to have 
military satellites to support operations, 
especially in anticipation of hybrid warfare. 
By having satellites, the TNI will be more 
integrated in terms of command control, 
information dissemination, and early 
detection to find out upcoming threats. 
Things that are known to be threats will be 
more quickly informed to all elements so 
that each unit will prepare its operational 
unit to act in a coordinated manner. 
The relevance of dealing with hybrid 
warfare with Artificial Intelligence 
technology cannot be separated from one 
type of hybrid war, namely cyber warfare. 
This type of war is classified as a hybrid 
war departing from the main actors who 
come from non-state actors although in its 
development the military is increasingly 
dominant as the actor. The use of 
cyberspace as a medium for AI technology 
is very crucial so that cyber-attacks can 
cripple national forces and even control 
them by the center of gravity using AI 
technology. 
There are 14 Artificial Intelligence (AI) 
implementations in the defense sector the 
fastest working and developing technology 
in the world is the military. After that, 
technology will enter the industrial sector 
and other sectors. Based on President Joko 
Widodo's direction in early July 2020 
regarding the application of Artificial 
Intelligence (AI) in the defense sector, the 
latest military technology has been able to 
combine weaponry instruments with the 
use of Artificial Intelligence.  
The 14 implementations of Artificial 
Intelligence in the defense sector include 
(Kurniawan, 2020), namely (1) 
Autonomous Machine System that capable 
in seeing patterns of hybrid warfare, (2) 
Artificial Intelligence which is a 
collaboration between Humans– Machines, 
(3) Artificial Intelligence which assists 
human operations/soldiers (Assisted human 
operations), (4) Advanced Human-
Machine which combines humans with 
machines in a more advanced and intensive 
manne, for example, AI that combines the 
human brain with a processor (Combat-
Teaming), (5) Artificial Intelligence for 
Network-enabled semi-autonomous 
weapons, (6) Artificial Intelligence for 
image understanding, (7) Artificial 
Intelligence for Face Recognition or 
recognizing and understanding humans, (8) 
Cognitive C41SR or Artificial Intelligence 
to support decision making, (9) Cognitive 
command decision making or Artificial 
Intelligence which was developed to make 
decisions more quickly, precisely, and 
accurately, (10) Artificial Intelligence for 
cognitive processors implemented in 
Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle 
(UCAV) vehicles, (11) Artificial 
 




Intelligence for cognitive countermeasure 
or protecting information, (12) Artificial 
Intelligence to predict cyber attacks 
(predictive system cyber attack), (13) 
Artificial Intelligence to assist force in the 
field (energy usage predictive system), (14) 
Artificial Intelligence  to monitor electronic 
devices in a war (Health Condition 
Predictive System). 
Some examples of applications of AI 
technology in the implementation of hybrid 
or cyber warfare include the use of UAV 
technology from Azerbaijan when repelling 
Armenian troops in the war between the 
two countries at the end of 2020. In the war 
theater, it was proven that Azerbaijani 
Kamikaze Drones played an active role in 
defeating Armenia because of the support 
from Azerbaijan's Electronic Warfare 
technology is superior. 
Another example of the development of 
AI technology by Russia is in terms of 
military modernization featuring the 
mastery of autonomous or robotic weapons 
platforms. In a report entitled Artificial 
Intelligence and Autonomy in Russia, the 
Kremlin government shows its seriousness 
by calling AI mastery Information 
Domination on the Battlefield. The Human 
Resources factor to develop Artificial 
Intelligence (AI) remains the most 
important. Even though Indonesia currently 
has lacks the quantity and quality of human 
resources of Artificial Intelligence 
development. The key to Artificial 
Intelligence is in Human Resources 
because no matter how sophisticated the 
technology is, humans still play an 
important role (Kurniawan, 2020). 
The threats facing Indonesia will 
become increasingly complex. In various 
war events that have occurred in various 
parts of the world lately, we cannot easily 
judge who the real actors/actors of war are, 
whether they are on behalf of a country or 
state actor or not a state or non-state actor. 
The background of the war was mixed 
between interests that were political, 
ideological, economic, or social aspects and 
others. Systems and methods of warfare are 
also complex because war is carried out by 
applying the concepts of conventional 
warfare and modern warfare. 
The dimensions of warfare that occur 
have also penetrated the dimensions of the 
virtual world or the cyber world as 
facilities/means/media of cyber warfare or 
cyber warfare. The warfare that is complex, 
the mix of various interests that become the 
background of the conflict, the unclear who 
is the real perpetrator of the war, the mix of 
methods, methods, techniques, and tactics 
of war is what is then referred to as Hybrid 
Warfare. Hybrid Warfare as a method of 
war is not new. Hybrid Warfare as a method 
of warfare has its roots in methods of 
warfighting of past conflicts; while not 
necessarily new as a category of conflict, it 
has the potential to change the future 






Military or TNI organizations that prioritize 
a modern universal perspective are a 
necessity as one of the efforts offered. This 
needs to be supported by the doctrine of 
national defense which accurately maps 
how an effort against hybrid warfare can 
transform from conventional forms of war 
to unconventional warfare and the actors 
involved. So, the key to Artificial 
Intelligence is in Human Resources 
because no matter how sophisticated the 
technology is, humans still play an 
important role. After all, Artificial 
Intelligence in the use of detection system 
technology and modern weapons requires 
high academic competence and skills on 
TNI soldiers guarding them. 
Regulating defense organizations and 
doctrines in the face of hybrid threats can 
be pursued in two ways.  Firstly, structuring 
the doctrine of national defense in response 
to hybrid warfare. This effort was pursued 
by redefining the TNI's doctrine to be more 
flexible, especially in guiding military 
operations in the face of hybrid war attacks. 
 




Secondly, that way above needs to be 
supported by the preparation of reliable 
human resources in terms of mastery of AI-
based weapon systems used in military 
operations against hybrid threats including 
their effectiveness when supporting non-
military elements with various elements.  
To achieve this, it is necessary to prepare 
the TNI with Artificial Intelligence 
Capability including the ability to organize 
and fight information operations by 
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